

# Civic

# protection:

## Education for civic resilience





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Education for civic resilience



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# Main conclusions

Effective civil defence and protection infrastructure is key to coping with and speedy recovery from all forms of major national crisis. It must be created and designed to combat all conceivable threats and situations.

Today, Poland faces a number of threats that are not entirely dominated by the spectre of military action or natural catastrophes, but also include socio-economic, hybrid and climatic sources and biological, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. From the given scenarios, the following specific effects may emerge:

- Civil unrest caused by economic crisis due to the disruption of the supply chain.
- Sustained disruption to the supply of electricity in large areas, giving rise to tensions in the performance of basic social functions and state institutions.
- Exacerbation of circulating disinformation, leading to loss of faith in state institutions and challenges to public order.
- Attacks on the information systems of state institutions, e.g., health, arresting the provision of basic health services to the population.
- Complex social, economic and biological effects accelerating climate change.

**It is thus necessary to adopt a holistic concept of civic resilience to address these concerns.** This concept primarily recognises resilience as the fusion of social, political, economic, environmental and military factors, not as the simple ability to defend against conventional aggression from external forces. To assure local resilience, the Supreme Audit Office Civic protection would fill in the gaps left today, to complement the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT).

The most important recommendations for improvement of civil resilience embrace areas of competence, resources, ethos and institutions, including:

1. **Creation of a new up-to-date training system**, complete with **professional qualifications for educators**, covering civil defence and accommodating improvement of individual civilian competences.
2. Provision of **supplies for individual security and safety** factored through local production and distribution.
3. Support for the creation of **local rescue teams** founded on the principles of **citizen and community ethos**.
4. Increases to **finance for duties of effective civil defence from central and community budgets**.
5. Acceptance of a **legal framework** for an effective civil protection system

# 1. Introduction

In the second decade of the 21st century, the situation of relative stability in central-eastern Europe was markedly perturbed by a series of crises: the financial crash of 2008; Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014; the Refugee Crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. In Poland, each of these crises exposed further national and regional institutional deficiencies, thus disturbing society's sense of security. For example, in public opinion polls between 1992 and 2013, an overwhelming majority of respondents asserted that there was no threat to Polish independence<sup>1</sup>. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) reported record levels of worry regarding Polish sovereignty that haven't been seen since 1991 (47% in 2014 from 13% in 2011). While this figure has now fallen, it is still relatively high. At the same time, the crises of the last decade revealed the preparedness of civil society to mobilise for self-help and self-defense. During the COVID-19 pandemic, defence related organisations engaged in disinfection of streets and supply of groceries to pensioners and the on-line group, 'Widzialna Ręka' (Visible Hand) and other similar self-help activities, quickly spread throughout the country.

This grassroots level of citizens' willingness to mobilise for common security has, to date, been organised primarily by the military and uniformed services, directly and indirectly, in the form of MOD-supported pro-defence organisations, military training courses in schools and universities and recruitment to the newly-formed Territorial Defence Forces (WOT). However, territorial defence cannot replace civilian defence activities, and the armed forces alone do not have the capacity to guarantee civilian resilience - a term used to describe the flexibility of civil institutions and society as a whole to counteract shocks and crises. In addition, of those Polish citizens who are prepared to contribute to areas of defence, most would not be able or willing to take up arms. In a March 2015 survey,

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<sup>1</sup> CBOS, NR 125/2014

64% expressed a willingness to engage in the event of foreign aggression on state territory, but only 27% of these respondents declared they would take military action - the other 37% would only take up unarmed roles<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, a 2014 CBOS survey revealed that 60% of the youngest respondents, aged 25 or below, were interested in membership of voluntary civil defence formations. How does civil defence appear against this background in Poland?

During the Cold War, both countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO maintained a high state of civil preparedness/readiness, which meant that the civil sector was well organised to deal with threats from war or other non-military sources. The geopolitical stability which followed the events of 1989 led to a meaningful reduction and professionalisation of the armed forces, reductions in their budget and capability for civil readiness. One direct effect from these changes was a sharp drop in respondents declaring any military training, down to 25% in 2014. Those declaring having participated in civil defence training exercises fell to 22%. Further, there were systematic reductions in expenditure on civil defence and personnel. In 2019, the Supreme Audit Office declared that Poland does not have an effective system for protecting its population.

These developments highlight the need to further reflect on the idea of civil protection in Poland - its current state, its strengths and weaknesses, and the potential and possible directions for development. The second part of this report addresses the diagnosis of the present state of civil defence in Poland and discusses the main challenges to overcome. The third part presents the concept of civil resilience as a broader concept for civil defence and is presented according to the measure of modern demands for security. The fourth part of this report links these discussions, describing directions for essential reform and presents substantial recommendations, such as the creation of a broad system of education and training covering civil protection.

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2 <https://tvn24.pl/polska/mniej-niz-jedna-trzecia-polakow-jest-gotowa-walczyz-za-kraj-sondaz-faktow-tvn-ra525137>

## 2. Polish Civil Defence

Poland, like only few other countries, has, in the past, experienced profound social catastrophes with military and non-military causes. Military conflict on Polish soil in both World Wars caused millions of civilian casualties. This not only resulted from the war itself but also from the politics of the occupiers. Furthermore, over the last three decades, the consequences of natural disasters affected the lives of hundreds of thousands. This makes it ever more important that Poland should grant security and protection to its citizens in the event such situations arise. This service should be provided by a Civil Defence system.

### 2.1. What is Civil Defence?

Civil Defence obligations are firmly based in international law. According to the first supplementary protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, 'Civil Defence' is defined as the satisfaction of humanitarian requirements laid out in article 61 of the protocol. These are intended to protect the civilian population against danger from armed conflict or famine, and combating their direct consequences, in addition to ensuring essential conditions for survival. At the same time, the term 'civil defence organisations' covers structures or formations created by authorized governments, sides in the conflict or bodies working at their behest, to fulfil any roles in exclusive provision of civil defence functions.

Examples of civil defence tasks include: evacuation of civilians, rescue, firefighting and provisional burial of the dead. These roles are of a non-military character – and it should be emphasised – non-military – and in time of war they cannot be undertaken by any military formation if they wish to continue to function under military command. It should be emphasised that, in a conflict situation, civil defence organisations enjoy status and protection, which should be respected by all sides. This means that civil defence, beyond remediation of the effects of catastrophe in many countries, is one of the most important protectors of the population in wartime.

Civil Defence also includes education roles on many levels. It also leads public information campaigns closely related to education, covering, for example, countering disinformation and above all the compulsory school subject, education for safety. With respect to national security, this foremost embraces first aid, rescue, preserving life and health. As indicated by the subject literature (Stochaj, 2020), the main hurdles to effective training in this area include the lack of recognition for local conditions and threat or inadequate practical training exercises.

## 2.2. The Present State of Civil Defence in Poland

The scale of demand for civil protection and the system for civil defence was best revealed by the 2019 report by the Supreme Audit Office, entitled, 'Citizen protection in the framework of crisis management and civil defence'. During their inspection, auditors reported the lack of an effective civilian protection system in Poland.

*"In the opinion of the Supreme Audit Office, in view of the state of preparation of Civil Defence formations, including their equipment, as stated above, it makes it practically impossible, during war, to support all civil protection tasks and, in the event of natural disaster, their contribution in the removal of its effects would be negligible."*

- Supreme Audit Office

The Ministry of the Interior and Administration, the Headquarters of the State Fire Brigade, the Government Security Centre, five provincial offices, six district offices and seven municipal offices (cities) were audited.

While the audit period covered 2015-2017, it should be noted that in the absence of legislative and systemic changes, the situation described in the document can be considered to remain extant. It is also worth noting that this was another Supreme Audit Office inspection of this area, and the previous two had also concluded in a negative assessment. In 2013, the lack of a coherent system of protection for the Polish population to combat crises was reported and in 2012, they criticised preparation of the country's civil defence structures for statutory tasks. The 2019 report was not only intended for verification of the implementation of previous civil defence audit recommendations, but also included the assessment of the efficiency of state structures in other areas of civil protection for crisis management. The audit also covered the possibilities for operation of the civil protection system, in real terms, reflecting responses to major storms which hit Poland on the 11th and 12th of August 2017.

The following is a table of selected conclusions from the Supreme Audit Office regarding Civil Defence preparedness and the means for effective prevention and remediation of the effects of military and non-military threats on a local level:

Conclusion	Details	Example	Direction for change
<b>Insufficient civil defence structures in Poland</b>	The size and nature of existing civil defence formations are inadequate to modern military and non-military threats	At the municipal level, only two of these seven municipalities audited set up civil defence formations. Also, two out of six county councils had not created any Civil Defence formation.	Increasing voluntary public participation in civil defence
<b>Insufficient use of community organisations</b>	Civil Defence formations necessary to carry out key tasks in the event of a military threat do not exploit the potential of civil organisations	At the municipal level, only one of these seven municipalities audited at the time of the inspection had a Civil Defence formation based on the structures of the Volunteer Fire Brigades operating in the JST.	Involvement of NGOs and informal groups in the creation of Civil Defence formations
<b>Insufficient level of civil defence training and education</b>	Lack of an effective training system to maintain readiness to participate in civil defence activities, both on the part of the relevant JST employees and civil defence formation members and residents - Supreme Audit Office	The National Inspectorate has identified examples of lack or ineffective training for management and performance of civil defence among the audited public authorities at all levels - provincial, county and municipal. - Supreme Audit Office	Creation of a scalable system for training civil defence formation members and the civilian population concerned
<b>Inadequate funding of Civil Defence duties</b>	According to the Supreme Audit Office, public authorities in Poland are not able to carry out the tasks included in the programmes to raise the level of civil defence due to insufficient financial resources.	One of the audited provincial offices, in an area with more than 3 million inhabitants, spent just over PLN 0.2 million in 2017 on civil defence tasks.	Increase commitment from the central budget and Community funds to creation of structures and resources for civil defence.
<b>Insufficient Civil Defence hardware resources</b>	Organisations' equipment and that in storage remains obsolete and availability is insufficient in quantity for civil protection needs.	In the audited local government units responsible for preparing the OC, supreme audit office staff identified equipment from prior to system transformation that did not meet the guidelines of the Head of the Civil Defence.	Harnessing the potential of Polish industrial groups and local economic ecosystems to meet civil defence duties.

<b>Lack of comprehensive statutory civil protection regulations</b>	Poland does not command comprehensive and effective, systemic regulation of civil defence nor is there a relationship between the operations of Civil Defence formations and the peacetime protection of the population.	New legislation on civil protection and civil protection has been in process since 2006 and, despite the development of several draft laws, has not resulted in the implementation of the proposed solutions in the form a comprehensive statutory act.	Comprehensive regulation of civil protection and civil defence in Poland in the form of a new law developed by a wide range of institutions involved in civil defence.
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For many years, the Polish Civil Defence System suffered from inadequate funding and under-manning of its respective formations.

Thousand. PLN	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Operational expenses</b>	20 636	20 150	19 182	18 636	22 792
<b>Technical equipment</b>	2 546	2 428	2 957	2 795	2 582
<b>Total</b>	23 182	22 578	22 139	21 431	25 374

From: Head of National Civil Defence, Ocena przygotowań w zakresie ochrony ludności i obrony cywilnej w Polsce za 2018 r. (i poprzednie) [Assessment of civil protection and civil protection preparations in Poland - reports for 2018 and prior]

	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Number of formations</b>	9 958	8 999	9 085	8 589
<b>Personal status</b>	106 758	96 614	90 777	87 366

From: Head of National Civil Defence, Ocena przygotowań w zakresie ochrony ludności i obrony cywilnej w Polsce za 2018 r. (i poprzednie) [Assessment of civil protection and civil protection preparations in Poland] reports for 2018 and 2017]

Any attempt to reopen this area should be considered even more attentively. This interprets the fact that the President of the Republic approved a new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland on the 12 May 2020, in which issues concerning civil defence and civil protection are clearly highlighted in the first part of the Document on State and Citizen Security, in the points concerning universal defence:

*2.2 Build the state's resilience to threats, including of the hybrid type, ensure the general nature of civil defence and civil protection, and accumulate and maintain the ability to replace necessary resources*

*2.6. Redefine the civil defence and protection system, giving it a general character, both in urban agglomerations and in rural areas, with an emphasis on building the capacity to adapt the system to changing challenges and threats. Develop law to comprehensively regulate civil defence.*

Because of the published strategy, law concerning the civil defence system is therefore to be drafted. At the same time, the need to strengthen the civil defence structure by formations complementary to the Territorial Defence Forces was recognised through the voluntary participation of people not previously involved with civil protection duties<sup>3</sup>.

It should be noted that to implement the objectives set out in the National Civil Defence Strategy properly, a broad level of cooperation between central and local authorities and civil society is needed.

## 2.4. Territorial Forces in the place of Civil Defence

With the lack of effective civil defence structures and systems described above, this role in provision of the security system is clearly taken by the Territorial Defence Forces established in 2017. The coronavirus pandemic is the latest crisis that clearly shows this observation. Already in March 2020, the Territorial Force had transformed from a training model in response to the crisis and was engaged in a nationwide mission code-named, „Resilient Spring”. According to the Territorial Force commander, Divisional General Wiesław Kukuła, „Its aim is to mitigate the effects of the crisis and to strengthen resilience to the crisis in local communities: Support for all local government and health institutions delivering assistance.” As part of the action, 16.5 thousand Territorial soldiers (up to 5.5 thousand per day) carried out a number of non-military activities: transporting food and medicine, supporting sanitation services, border control, supporting nursing homes, veterans and Social Assistance Centres, running a psychological helpline, donating blood, supporting Police by patrolling the streets and checking on those quarantined, as well as testing for coronavirus.

„Resilient Spring” revealed the dual civic-military nature of the Territo-

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<sup>3</sup> Statement by Minister Paweł Soloch for „Cafe Armia” on Polish Radio on 16.05.2020: <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/130/4437/Artykul/2511785,Szef-BBN-powstana-dwie-ustawy-dotyczace-Strategii-Bezpieczenstwa-Narodowego>

rial Service, where in addition to conducting general military tasks, the formation is also functioning as a ‚paramilitary civil society‘ serving local communities. Despite the effective and well-judged social inclusion of Territorial Forces in countering the pandemic, the use of military actors to protect the population in peacetime also entails several serious problems or compromises.

Firstly, it would not be possible to use Territorial Force resources for civil defence during armed conflict. In this context, the effective use of Territorial Forces may, paradoxically, divert public attention away from the poor state of civil defence and, more generally, deficiencies in social resilience. Secondly, although in the light of civil defence deficit, mobilisation of the Territorial Force to combat coronavirus was understandable, the involvement of military actors in internal security or health care tasks could be ambivalently construed by the public. This is mainly due to widespread association of the military with armed conflict and their use of coercive measures, but also may relate to their specific mode of operation and organizational culture which differ from the internal logic and requirements of care or humanitarian aid in emergencies.

# 3. Civil Resilience and Civic Society

As the COVID-19 pandemic showed, the threats Poland faces today are not strictly dominated by the spectre of military action or natural catastrophes but also include socio-economic, hybrid and climactic sources and biological. The following specific effects may emerge from the following scenarios:

- Civil unrest caused by economic crisis in association with disruption of the supply chain.
- Sustained disruption to the supply of electricity to large areas, giving rise to tensions in the performance of basic social functions and state institutions.
- Exacerbation of circulating disinformation, leading to loss of faith in state institutions and challenges to public order.
- Attacks on the information systems of state institutions, e.g., health, arresting the provision of basic health services to the population.
- Complex social, economic and biological effects accelerating climate change.

It should be noted that all the above examples may coexist and mutually reinforce their social impact.

While civil protection strategies and civilian institutions in the past focused on the concept of civil defence, in the 21st century, international discussion of the subject has been dominated by the concept of resilience. The popularity of this term in the discourse of public and security policies can be explained by the concept itself, which seems apposite in an era of permanently cascading crises, in which collapse in one social sphere brings turbulence to the next. An extensive literature review shows that resilience is primarily defined as the ability of society to effectively resist, adapt and regenerate in emergency or crisis by protecting its core functions and resources.[1]

## 3.1. NATO's understanding of resilience

The concept of resilience to NATO experts reflects the North Atlantic Treaty itself. In accordance with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, Member States are required to build their own deterrence and defence capacity:

... in order to achieve the objectives of this Treaty more effectively, Parties shall, individually and together, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to repel armed assault through permanent and effective self-help and mutual assistance.[2]

After 1989, as a result of geopolitical stabilisation, NATO moved towards the reduction and professionalism of the armed forces, towards an expeditionary model. Consequently, European member states significantly reduced their budgets and capabilities for both territorial defence and civil preparedness. The recent change of the strategic environment in Central and Eastern Europe, symbolised by Russia's annexation of Crimea and new hybrid threats, has forced NATO to rethink the alliance's strategic objectives. In response to the new conditions, the North Atlantic Alliance resolved to strengthen its deterrent and defence strategy on the Eastern flank.

Since the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, deterrence and defence have been implemented through a strategy strengthening the resilience of member states. In accordance with NATO's official interpretation, resilience is the combination of military capability and civilian preparedness. It has seven precepts:

- 1) guaranteeing continuity of government and key government services;
- 2) assuring secure supply of energy;
- 3) ability to effectively solve problems related to the uncontrolled movement of people;
- 4) adequate and secure food and water supplies;
- 5) ability to deal with problems related to large numbers of victims;
- 6) secure communication systems;
- 7) secure transport systems.[3].

## 3.2. “Total defence”: resilience in the Baltic–Nordic region

Presented in these dimensions, NATO’s understanding of resilience focuses more on the state’s ability to manage in times of crisis through strategic cooperation with key civilian actors: private business and state institutions rather than society as such. However, in the Nordic-Baltic regional case, the strategy is elastic to the resilience of society itself. In these countries, strategists have recently returned to the Cold War concept of „total defence” where the entire society is involved in realm of defence through both military and civilian channels. The Minister of National Defence of Latvia defined this approach in the following way:

“We suggest changing the paradigm of state defence from the idea that a fighter is just a soldier with a gun in his hand and the support of alliance soldiers, to the belief that every patriot in the country can make a priceless contribution to defence”<sup>4</sup>.

## 3.3. Towards holistic civic resilience

To date, discussions on resilience in Poland and the region have been dominated by the conventional national security perspective that focuses primarily on civilian institutions and society and defending against external aggression. There are several challenges to this understanding. Firstly, this view of resilience is too narrow – it does not sufficiently integrate other non-military security dimensions – sociological, economic, political and the climate.

Secondly, resilience is also a negative concept – defined by the capacity to repel the external crisis swiftly and for effective recovery to the pre-crisis state. In this sense, it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of crisis, which is a phenomenon that fundamentally changes society, from which there is no simple return to the earlier status quo. This narrow and negative understanding of resilience is plainly visible in Poland, since most efforts to raise social resilience involve military channels and military or paramilitary actors who, despite their best intentions, are unable to provide the public with comprehensive resilience.

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed a number of limitations to this understanding of resilience. Firstly, the health crisis has highlighted that a narrow vision of resilience as an ability to repel external aggression or to defend borders does not correspond to the challenges faced by modern societies in the areas of health, the environment or economics. Secondly,

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
<sup>4</sup> <https://www.sargs.lv/lv/izglitiba/2017-04-06/valsts-aizsardzibas-maciba-vidusskolas-varetu-viens-no-obligatajiem-izveles#lastcomment>

the pandemic has also shown that despite commitment from various military and civilian actors against its effects, Polish society will not return to a state of „normality”, but is emerging from the crisis even more weakened, bearing its costs in the form of recession, rising unemployment and a drop in public sector earnings.

Consequently, it seems more appropriate to adopt a holistic concept of civic resilience. Such a concept, firstly, understands resilience as a combination of social, political, economic, environmental and military factors, and not only as the ability to defend against conventional external aggression. Secondly, it is based on a positive project to rebuild through the emergency rather than the negative concept of simply repelling a crisis. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed deeper structural weaknesses in health care and civil defence, as well as the existing economic model based on privatisation of profit and socialisation of cost. From the holistic perspective on resilience, it should be inferred that to render future society truly resilient, all these weaknesses must be addressed.


Finally, in line with the overall concept of resilience, focussing primarily on military development of competences and institutions proves inadequate. Firstly, it is only possible in peacetime when military actors do not perform a border defence role. Secondly, it is not able to respond to the systemic weaknesses of public institutions but only offers temporary solutions in direct response to crisis. Thirdly, only a part of society can participate in any resilience mission through military channels. Research in Poland and the region shows that a large group of citizens is able and willing to engage in crisis activities through civil and civic channels, but not under arms or in association with military organizations (Bartkowski, 2015). This untapped social potential can only be harnessed if defence is based on civic duty not limited to the military perspective.

### Map with examples of threats at the local level




# 4. Directions for essential changes

Recommendation matrix:



## 4.1. The Competence dimension

There is a need for a new system of modern, mass education in this area that extends beyond the existing core curriculum, 'education for safety', and delivered as lifelong education.



Only modernising and making education more attractive will allow real improvement in the security of individual citizens and the building of a comprehensive resilience system in Poland.

The training programme should exceed the educational framework for security and additionally include civic skills such as:

- Tackling modern social threats, disinformation, and practical cooperation with other state structures such as the Territorial Defence Forces.
- Embedding trained people in local government activities as the primary organisers of local civil protection.
- Self-organising social organisation skills, which are part of the Solidarity tradition and provide a decentralised response to emerging macro-scale threats.

The vocational qualification system will render civil protection education scalable for as many citizens as possible while maintaining an adequate level of quality training.

## 4.2. The Resource dimension

- **Availability of individual means to protection** must be ensured by an organised system for their production and distribution.
  - Taking advantage of the production capacity of Polish large industrial companies, Poland has an opportunity for sovereignty over basic individual protection measures. This is vital when global supply chains are broken
  - Distribution of materials could be concentrated around public institutions - both central and local authorities. A welcome form

a collective purchasing mechanism organised by the local government at home or at local authority level inside the EU.

- Access to protection measures organised in this way, to citizens and civil defence formations, would not only give them the elasticity to secure themselves and their families, but would also demonstrate true community action in practice.
- **Increasing funding of civil protection roles from central and community funds** is vital to achieve the desired level of resilience in Poland.
  - As the conclusions from the Supreme Audit Office indicate, funding for civil defence tasks is inadequate in relation to real needs. To build universal social resilience, an increase in funding is necessary.
  - Sources of finance for the development of local human resources in this domain should not be exclusive to local government budgetary resources but should also include grants from the central budget or community funds.
  - A scalable civil protection training and education system, covering an introduction of a qualification framework for educators, would offer the most efficient use of public funds at a moderate cost and high effectiveness.

## 4.3. The Ethos dimension and organizational culture

- **Placing the citizen protection educator project in the civic and civil ethos domain**, guaranteeing an attractive identity, draws on the tradition of Polish civil resilience and promotes democratic citizenship and active solidarity.
  - A purely technical approach to training, in which the emphasis is solely on resources and competences, can give rise to a form of an ideological vacuum. Without a strong ethos element, members may adopt the attractive but polarizing - or even radical - political rhetoric that dominates public life.
  - The project should be embedded in the long-standing tradition of Polish civil resilience that includes the activities of various social and underground groups from the time of partition through the time of occupation to the era of anti-communist opposition. Today, this tradition is largely

forgotten and considered ancillary to the tradition of armed resistance. However, researchers point to its key role in the Polish path to sovereignty (Bartkowski, 2013). In addition, social scientists agree that civilian, civic resistance is much more effective and productive in the long run, more likely to lead to a democratic outcome and is able to mobilize more support and to command a greater membership than military channels (Chenoweth, Stephan, 2011).

- In accordance with this ethos, the brief for civil protection educators is inclusive. It is open to all who want to work together for their communities, regardless of gender, religion, ethnicity or worldview. As such, civic protection can be a space for civic cooperation in an era of increasing polarization. By fostering construction of bridges between different groups, the project increases the resilience of society to crises resulting from socio-political polarisation when used for disinformation purposes.

## 4.4. The Institutional dimension

- The creation of voluntary groups supporting civil protection measures in the event of macro-level threats should be welcomed. Just as the new Territorial Force has included many Poles in the Armed Forces system, a similar idea is needed to modernise civil protection and defence. The right course of action is to transform the neglected civil defence formations of today into new personnel, reserve teams, organised in a similar way to the territorial defence forces, to which these teams could be complementary and supporting.
- In line with the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Office and conclusions of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of May 2020, a new law on civil protection and civil defence is recommended to comprehensively regulate the implementation of these tasks during peacetime and possible armed conflict. It is important to create a broad coalition of the institutions involved while ensuring the effectiveness of the legislative process. Moreover, it is possible to build on prior legislative work in this area, for example, the draft law on civil protection and civil protection of 2 July 2019. Consequently, the desired legislation should define not only the nature of the new Civil Defence in Poland, but also the mechanisms for wider funding of its tasks to maximise the effectiveness of civil protection in our country, regardless of the nature of the prevailing danger.

- It is also necessary to embed the civil defence educator project in **the holistic concept of civic resilience**. Thinking must be two-pronged: both building a self-annealing social organisation capable of repelling crises and towards rejuvenation of existing institutions (e.g. health care) in a civic spirit and building on lessons learned from the pandemic crisis. Only through this commitment can it become a positive, forward-thinking project that gives citizens a sense of dignity and real inclusion in the structure of the state, decisive in its impact on its shape, and not only negative – one that only relies on their potential to “put out fires” after the crisis.
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[1] <https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/09/17/what-is-a-resilient-society/>

[2] NATO: [http://www.nato.int/cps/cn/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.html](http://www.nato.int/cps/cn/natohq/official_texts_17120.html)

[3] <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2016/03/30/odporno-sc-kluczowy-element-obrony-zbiorowej/index.html>

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