

### **ONLINE WEBINAR**

# PyPSA-PL-mini: an exploratory model of the Polish energy system

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# Instrat in a nutshell

# Supercharging policies and public opinion with open data and research for a fair, green and digital economy



📥 PyPSA

Strong R&D fundamentals: in-house energy modelling & data intelligence tools



Strong network with policy makers, investors and campaigners



Poland based, scaling up towards Brussels and Eastern Europe



> 25 researchers, data analysts and policy experts on the same goal



7 years in action on the ground



> 6m monthly media reach in PL Growing internationally





# **PyPSA-PL-mini:**

### an exploratory model of the Polish energy system

Presenting: Patryk Kubiczek, Instrat

Team: Patryk Kubiczek, Michał Smoleń, Wojciech Żelisko

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# Coal is a diminishing foundation of the Polish power sector

Structure of historical net generation and trade of electricity in 2022 and 2023 (TWh)



In 2023, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the power sector totalled approximately **110 MtCO<sub>2</sub>**, a reduction of **20 MtCO<sub>2</sub>** compared to 2022.

Coal's contribution to fulfilling domestic electricity demand decreased from **70%** to **58%**, while renewables' share rose from **23%** to **29%**.

Source: Instrat's own analysis based on the historical net electricity production and demand (ARE). Imports are counted towards generation, exports towards consumption. Pumped storage hydropower (PSH) is a net consumer of electricity.



# Poland approaching carbon neutrality

Four scenarios for the Polish energy transition until 2040



### **Instrat Energy Modelling**

In 2023, we developed four model-based scenarios for the future of the Polish energy system until 2040.

Our analysis indicates that by 2040, Poland could achieve an **85-90%** share of RES in electricity consumption in the cost-optimal manner. This would reduce the yearly emissions from the power sector to **less than 10 MtCO<sub>2</sub>**.

→ <u>https://instrat.pl/poland-2040</u>

How can one understand better the logic behind optimisation-based energy modelling?



# Agenda









## What is PyPSA-PL-mini?





**PyPSA-PL** is Instrat's in-house open energy system model inspired by the <u>PyPSA-Eur</u> <u>project</u>.

The latest version (v2.1) includes heating, mobility, and hydrogen sectors.

Find out more at github.com/instrat-pl/pypsa-pl.



## PyPSA-PL-mini



**PyPSA-PL-mini** is Instrat's simple optimisation model of the Polish energy system model intended for testing and educational purposes.

Model's source code and data are **open**.

Find out more at <u>github.com/instrat-pl/</u><u>pypsa-pl-mini</u>.



# **PyPSA-PL-mini**

## How do we reduce the complexity?



#### **Power sector only**

Let's start simple and focus on the **power supply only**. CHP plant operation is fixed and not optimised.



## Limit the hourly scope

Instead of the whole year, let's model **4 representative weeks** (one per season) at an **hourly resolution**.



### No cross-border flows

Modelling neighbour countries adds significant complexity – let's skip it for a moment.



### Simplify the inputs

Simplify input files and their structure compared to PyPSA-PL  $\rightarrow$  inputs



# **PyPSA-PL-mini** What do we gain?



### Fast model

Reduced complexity means the model runs **in a matter of seconds** and does not require high-end computational resources.



### Improved understanding

Model's modular structure and fewer components make it easier to **understand** how the power system works.



## Interactivity

The user can **experiment** with the model directly and rapidly **test** new features, e.g. in a Jupyter notebook.



### Lower barrier entry

The model can be easily embedded into environments with **minimal or no coding expertise required**.







## Use case 1:

market dynamics under forced operations



# Forced baseload operation of conventional power plants distorts the electricity market

Load profile of a selected coal-powered generating unit by 2030

Flexibility constraints None Unit-level Systemic (Frequency Containment Reserve)



Source: Instrat's own analysis based on PyPSA-PL modelling (baseline scenario for installed capacity) • The **unit-level** flexibility constraints are non-zero start-up and shut-down costs, minimum time in on and off state, and minimum stable output level of natural gas, coal and biomass units. Those constraints are implemented in PyPSA-PL in an approximate manner (linear relaxation). • In the variant of **systemic** flexibility constraints, it is assumed that only coal and natural gas JWCD units can provide FCR service, which leads to their production surplus. The condition of a minimum stable output level to provide FCR is implemented in an approximate manner.

Currently in Poland, only fossil fuel-powered centrally dispatchable units (JWCD) provide system services, such as frequency regulation.

To do so, they need to **operate at least around their technical minimum (40-50%)** – even when the electricity they produce could be delivered more cheaply by RES.

Our analysis suggested that the provision of system services by JWCD has larger impact on RES curtailment than the unit-level constraints.

#### Learn more:

→ <u>https://instrat.pl/baseload-power</u>



# **Question 1:**

How does the forced operation of conventional power plants impact electricity market dynamics and systemic costs?  $\rightarrow$  <u>notebook</u>

#### Market dynamics

The question focuses on the short-term market dynamics, not the long-term planning, hence we assume fixed installed capacities.



#### Force minimum operation

We represent the forced operation of conventional power plants by setting their minimum hourly capacity utilisation *p\_max\_pu* (~25% in the current system).



#### **Optimise dispatch**

We task the model with optimising OPEX, i.e. selecting generators and dispatch times to minimise fuel expenses, CO<sub>2</sub> fees, and other variable cost, akin to an ideal electricity market.



#### **Explore consequences**

For each selected *p\_max\_pu* optimise the system and calculate total operational cost, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, marginal electricity prices, etc.



## p\_min\_pu = 25% (conventional baseload of around 6 GW)

## p\_min\_pu = 0% (no baseload)



Forced operation of conventional plants leads to **curtailment** of wind and solar (vRES) energy.

In such a case, **storage technologies** (mostly hydro PSH) are dispatched to minimise the energy losses.



#### $p_min_pu = 25\%$ (conventional baseload of around 6 GW)



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If curtailment is avoided, wind and solar PV plants rarely, if ever, become marginal electricity generators, thus maintaining **higher** price levels.



#### $p_{min_pu} = 25\%$ (conventional baseload of around 6 GW)







If curtailment is avoided, wind and solar PV plants rarely, if ever, become marginal electricity generators, thus maintaining **higher price levels**.

At the same time, lifting the baseload constraint allows the market to operate more efficiently, hence **unit production costs are lowered**.



## Model-based answers to Q1:

How does the forced operation of conventional power plants impact electricity market dynamics and systemic costs?  $\rightarrow$  <u>notebook</u>



#### **Higher costs**

It costs more money to curtail RES and burn fossil fuels if curtailment can be avoided.



### Lower market prices

Forced non-economic operation of conventional plants make it more likely for wind and solar to become marginal generators, lowering the prices.



### **Higher emissions**

Opportunity to lower emissions by utilising more RES is missed.



#### Lower revenues

Conventional power plants effectively subsidise the electricity market at the expense of their diminished revenues or potential losses











## **Question 2:**

What could be Poland's cost-optimal electricity mix in 2023 assuming no limitation on new capacity deployment?  $\rightarrow$  <u>notebook</u>



#### **Optimal investments**

The question focuses on long-term investment planning, hence we have to take into account both operational and investment costs.



# Define which technologies to deploy and which to retire

The model operates within a defined opportunity space, deciding which technologies to deploy (e.g., wind) and which to retire (e.g., coal) to reduce maintenance costs.



# Optimise dispatch and investment jointly

Annualise the overnight investment costs and find a solution minimising the sum of CAPEX and OPEX.



#### Vary cost assumptions

The result is sensitive to costs of new infrastructure and carbon pricing, which are uncertain for long-term planning. Therefore, exploring consequences of different assumptions is crucial.



p\_min\_pu = 25%+ allow investment in wind, solar, batteries, natural gas p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas



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Under continued

#### p min pu = 0%+ allow investment in wind, solar, batteries, natural gas

p min pu = 0%+ allow investment in wind, solar, batteries, natural gas + allow retirement of coal-fired units



Additionally, if we permit retiring of coal-fired power plants, we create economic space for an additional 4 GW of

Furthermore, it's economically viable to construct around 4 GW of new batteries.



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 83 EUR/tCO2

p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2



#### battery large power hydro PSH power hydro ROR solar PV roof solar PV ground wind onshore biogas CHP biomass wood CHP biomass wood power other CHP natural gas CHP natural gas power lignite power hard coal CHP 8 hard coal power

## Assuming a carbon price of **140 EUR/tCO<sub>2</sub>**,

resembling realistic ETS allowance costs around 2030, the optimal solar PV capacity increases by an additional **5 GW**.

Battery capacity gains another **1 GW**, with the optimal storage-to-power ratio rising from 3h to 5h.

Additionally, in this higher  $CO_2$  price setting, new gas-fired units with a capacity of **4 GW** partially displace old coal-fired plants.



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2

 p\_min\_pu = 0%
 + allow investment in wind, solar, batteries, natural gas
 + allow retirement of coal-fired units co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
 wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75% battery\_cost\_factor = 50%





Investment costs of solar PV, wind turbines, and batteries are likely to decrease.

Interestingly, this assumed cost decrease does not significantly impact solar PV and battery capacity.

However, the optimal wind onshore capacity increases by an additional **4 GW**.



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%
+ allow investment in nuclear power
 nuclear\_cost\_factor = 150%



Nuclear power, if permitted, has the potential to further reduce systemic costs.

However, its investment costs will likely amount to at least **50 bln PLN/GW**, which is 150% of the typical cost assumption.

Under this scenario, an optimal capacity of around **4 GW** for nuclear power is suggested.



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%

p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%
+ allow investment in nuclear power
 nuclear\_cost\_factor = 150%





Both scenarios incorporate massive curtailment of variable solar and wind energy – **18-27%** of available vRES energy is wasted.



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%

p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%
+ allow investment in nuclear power
 nuclear\_cost\_factor = 150%





The total systemic cost (variable and fixed costs, including annualised CAPEX) between scenarios show only a slight difference: **72.1 bln PLN/year** with nuclear compared to **72.5 billion PLN/year** w/o nuclear.



p\_min\_pu = 0%
+ allow investment in wind, solar,
 batteries, natural gas
+ allow retirement of coal-fired units
 co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
 wind\_and\_solar\_cost\_factor = 75%
 battery\_cost\_factor = 50%
+ allow investment in nuclear power
 nuclear\_cost\_factor = 150%





p\_min\_pu = 25%
co2\_price = 140 EUR/tCO2
+ disallow all investments and retirements

If the current system had to operate under a carbon pricing of 140 EUR/tCO2, the total cost would reach as much as **114 billion PLN** annually – excluding annualised investment costs of existing infrastructure.

That is over **40 bln PLN** more than in the optimal investment scenario.



## Model-based answers to Q2:

What could be Poland's cost-optimal electricity mix in 2023 assuming no limitation on new capacity deployment?  $\rightarrow$  <u>notebook</u>



### **Nuclear and RES**

Solutions incorporating realistic cost assumptions are likely to combine nuclear power with RES.



# Batteries help but firm capacities still present

Retaining some old coal-fired plants as backups may be cost-optimal rather than overinvesting in gas-fired capacities or batteries.



# Massive RES curtailment may be optimal

Wind and solar energy is so cheap that optimal solutions afford to lose even as much as one quarter of its volume.



# Carbon pricing influences the capacity mix

High carbon prices incentivise battery deployment and result in the displacement of coal by natural gas in the role of firm capacity.







## **Escaping the model land:** what have we missed?

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#### Flexible new demand

New flexible demand from electrolysers, BEVs, and P2H technologies is likely to prevent significant RES curtailment.



#### **Grid expansion costs**

Both RES and nuclear dominated systems will require significant grid reinforcements, whether at the transmission or distribution level.

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#### **Alternatives to CHP plants**

CHP plants are unlikely to remain at their current capacity, creating room for other electricity generators.



#### **Robust statistics**

Four weeks of weather and demand statistics are insufficient to robustly determine the required level of firm generation capacities.



#### **Cross-border flows**

Exporting electricity surplus may increase the profitability of new investments. Imports can help avoid over-sized peak capacities.



#### **Policy-based distortions**

Policy-based financial instruments and compensations, such as capacity payments or CfD schemes, are not included in the cost calculations.



# **Lessons learned**



# Renewables make difference

Savings due to fast RES deployment within the current system are evident.



# Simple models help formulate hypotheses

Plausible statements can be derived from simple model results but they need to be verified with other methods.



### Systemic perspective

Lower market prices do not necessarily translate to lower costs: any compensations paid by the TSO ultimately falls on end users.



### Transparency adds value

Details are important, which is why energy modelling and data should be open source and open access.





#### Patryk Kubiczek

patryk.kubiczek@instrat.pl

# We are looking forward to hearing from you



